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THE HAGUE LINE IN THE GULF OF MAINE:
IMPETUS OR IMPEDIMENT TO ECOSYSTEMIC
REGIME BUILDING?
John Alton Duff∗

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, a Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), at the
behest of the United States and Canada, delineated a maritime boundary
between the two nations partitioning the Gulf of Maine.1 In doing so, the
Court did what Solomon would have counseled against, slicing a living
system in two. Twenty-five years after the decision, with a wealth of
new information about the status, trends, and challenges of the Gulf of
Maine ecosystem, a simple question arises: does the Hague Line
facilitate or frustrate ecosystemic regime building? This paper examines
how, if at all, the ICJ’s boundary line has played a role in efforts to
engage in ecosystem management in the Gulf of Maine. In doing so, it
sets the stage for more detailed presentations on bilateral efforts to
manage and maintain ecological components and services that the
ecosystem provides.
II. ECOSYSTEM REGIMES: THREE FACTORS
Legal scholars who examine the emergence of legal institutions in
response to ecological principles characterize such developments as
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the University of Maine School of Law for the invitation to participate in the 2009 Gulf
of Maine Symposium. This paper reflects the presentation made at the symposium.
Thanks also to the National Sea Grant Law Center for encouraging development of this
research.
1. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246, (Oct. 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case].
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‘ecosystem regime’ development.2 I employ that term since it reflects
this discussion’s context and captures what I have considered to be three
important interacting factors in terms of marine resource development
and law: 1) ecosystem value/capacity/relationships; 2) ocean and coastal
use and development; and, 3) ocean and coastal law and policy
development (see figure 1).3

Figure 1. A general depiction of three factors leading to the
emergence of ecosystemic regimes.
III. THE THREE FACTORS IN THE GULF OF MAINE
The history of U.S. and Canadian marine resource development in
the late twentieth century was significantly influenced by a set of
technology and policy linked factors that allowed both nations to extend
2. See RICHARD O. BROOKS, ROSS JONES & ROSS A. VIRGINIA, LAW AND ECOLOGY:
THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM REGIME (2002).
3. While this figure may be a novel depiction of the relationship between the factors,
legal scholars have used this relational context for quite some time. See William Burke’s
decades-long contribution to this field from his early work, MYRES S. MCDOUGAL &
WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962), to his establishment of the journal OCEAN
DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW (ODIL) in 1970, through his textbooks, articles,
and other books. [Disclosure: I serve on the editorial board of ODIL].
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their research and resource exploitation capacity further offshore, with
growing jurisdictional authority and with greater economic efficiency.4
Technological advances in navigation and shipbuilding developed during
the Second World War, and the benefits of those advances, spread from
military endeavors to economic endeavors.5 Identification of offshore oil
and gas reserves along with new efficiencies in deepwater fishing
prompted many coastal states, including the United States and Canada, to
deploy their nationals, their technology, and their appetites into
heretofore little used ocean areas. States began proffering claims of
offshore jurisdiction and authority, such as U.S. President Truman’s
continental shelf claims in 1945.6 Such claims in turn prompted the
convening of United Nations sponsored conventions designed to
facilitate multilateral agreements over how and to what degree a coastal
state might claim exclusive use or authority over offshore space.7
In the mid-1970s, Canada and the United States each claimed
extended exclusive fishery management zones which overlapped in the
Georges Bank region of the Gulf of Maine.8 Unable to reach an accord
via direct bilateral negotiation, the two countries submitted the dispute to
a Chamber of the ICJ. Both countries employed natural systems
characterizations of the area in dispute to bolster their respective
arguments. The United States argued that Georges Bank represented a
distinct ecosystem and, accordingly, it ought to be managed as such by
the country with the more proximate claims to its entirety.9 Canada
4. See Ted L. McDorman, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS: INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 9-32 (2009).
5. Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Our Nation and the
Sea, A Plan for National Action 35 (Jan. 1969), available at
http://www.lib.noaa.gov/noaainfo/heritage/ stratton/title.html.
6. Proclamation No. 2667, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Sept. 28, 1945), available at
oceancommission.gov/documents/gov-oceans/Truman.pdf.
7. See e.g., Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 (relating to high seas “freedoms); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone art. 24, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (territorial sea
and contiguous zone authority); Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (addressing continental shelf interests); Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17
U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (regarding living marine resource management rights and
responsibilities).
8. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90
Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891(2007)) (articulating the U.S.
claim). Canada claimed a 200 mile fishery zone on January 1, 1977. See Fishing Zones
of Canada Order (Zones 4 and 5) C.R.C., c. 1548 (1977)).
9. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246, 276 (Oct. 12).
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countered that while the area might be characterized as a distinct
ecosystem it nonetheless resided within a larger biogeographic region
and, accordingly, any judgment based on the smaller scale unit
characterization would still result in the severance of a natural system.10
The ICJ Chamber, confronted with countering natural systems
arguments, employed neither. First, the Chamber highlighted the fact
that while both countries used ecological characterizations, neither side
did so in such a compelling way as to override the other.11 More
importantly, noted the Justices, the submission by the two States called
for a single delimitation line defining both a continental shelf delineation
as well as a water column delineation.12 Since those two ecospheres
were identifiably distinct and to some degree incongruous, the Court
highlighted the challenge of using a single set of ecological criteria for a
delineation of two distinct, albeit connected, ecological spaces
(submerged land and superjacent water column). “[The] Chamber has
already pointed out the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of adopting,
for the purpose of such a dual delimitation, a [single] criterion disclosed
by objective analysis to be essentially ecological.”13
The Chamber drew a boundary line—the Hague line—severing
Georges Bank by awarding the southwest (and major) portion to the
United States and the northeast portion to Canada.14 In doing so, the
Chamber acknowledged the trade-off being constructed: the two states
wanted a single line to delimit both continental shelf and water column
jurisdiction. Constructing a single line, noted the Chamber, comes at the
expense of consideration of ecosystem principles where such principles
might suggest one line for the substrate-oriented ecosystem and another
for the water-column-oriented ecosystem.15 Furthermore, the opinion was
prescient in its prediction that this trade-off decision of simplicity over
system would continue to be attractive.
[I]t can be foreseen that . . . an increasingly general demand for
single delimitation [of the continental shelf and superjacent
waters] so as to avoid as far as possible the disadvantages
10. Id. at 275-76.
11. Id. at 277.
12. Id. at 267.
13. Id. at 326.
14. Id. at 326. In addition, a variety of illustrations of the maritime delimitation line
are viewable on the web by employing the search term “Gulf of Maine delimitation.” See
e.g., Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Technical Report)
(Mar. 30, 1984), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/125437.pdf.
15. Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 326-27.
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inherent in a plurality of separate delimitations, preference will
henceforth inevitably be given to criteria that, because of their
more neutral character, are best suited for use in a multi-purpose
delimitation.16
The “Hague Line” boundary was accordingly established eschewing
ecologically detailed criteria for more neutral criteria. Simplicity having
won the day, ecosystem-oriented management would have to wait.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF SPLITTING THE BABY
Having suggested above that the ICJ Chamber employed nonSolomonic behavior in “splitting the baby,” my further reflection on the
judgment and its effects suggests that it was deeply insightful,
instructively informative, and wise even when constrained in its scope of
decision-making. The Chamber’s insight is evident in its thorough
review and consideration of the ecosystem factors that might be
considered in delimiting ocean space. The decision was instructive in
that it explained why it could not employ ecosystem factors effectively in
the case at hand while putting prospective maritime boundary claimants
and the legal community at large on notice of the importance of
considering such factors. And finally, the Chamber’s decision, while
constrained by the request of the parties to delineate a single boundary,
may have constructed a line that, due to its system-splitting effects,
would require the two states to reach across that line from time to time to
engage in joint custody of the ecosystem; ecological assemblages that
would not be constrained by the application of human map-making.
The challenges left in the wake of the Gulf of Maine case have been
addressed over the course of the last twenty-five years in a variety of
ways. A few ‘joint custody’ examples follow.
Not long after the Hague Line came into effect, government,
nongovernment, and private sector stakeholders recognized the need for
collaborative efforts to engage in research and information sharing
endeavors to facilitate intelligent joint custody of the Gulf of Maine. In
1989, the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment (the
Council) was established to “maintain and enhance environmental
quality in the Gulf of Maine to allow for sustainable resource use by
existing and future generations.”17 The Council began as a coalition of
16. See id. at 327 (emphasis added).
17. Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, About the Council, Overview
Mission Statement and Principles, http://www.gulfofmaine.org/council/mission.php (last
visited June 10, 2010).
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U.S. states (Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts) and Canadian
provinces (New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) and thereafter gained the
attention and membership of federal agencies from both countries. Over
the course of the last two decades, the Council has provided grant
funding to engage in research, conservation, and management efforts,
developed ecosystem monitoring programs, served as an information
portal for a variety of Gulf of Maine stewardship endeavors, and
facilitated cooperative arrangements between and among public, private,
and nongovernmental actors.18
In 1991, a more research oriented group focusing on Gulf of Maine
issues coalesced to form the Regional Association for Research on the
Gulf of Maine (RARGOM).19 Since its inception, RARGOM researchers
from universities and resource management agencies have worked
together to examine a wide variety of Gulf-wide issues including,
ecosystem dynamics,20 circulation modeling,21 habitat,22 and ecosystem
stressors.23 These research efforts are indicative of RARGOM’s
boundary spanning efforts to bring together researchers from both sides
of the Hague Line.
From time to time a particular Gulf of Maine boundary-spanning
concern will prompt researchers from the United States and Canada to
work together. Concerns related to the impacts associated with harmful
algal blooms served as the impetus for the development of the Gulf of
Maine Ecology of Harmful Algal Blooms (ECOHAB) project in 1997.24
Commonly referred to as “red tides,” harmful algal blooms (HABs) can
induce paralytic shellfish poisoning in humans.25 The health effects of
18. Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, http://www.gulfofmaine.org
(last visited June 10, 2010).
19. See RARGOM, Regional Association for Research on the Gulf of Maine,
http://www.rargom.org/ (last visited June 10, 2010).
20. Regional Association for Research on the Gulf of Maine, Proceedings of the Gulf
of Maine Ecosystem Dynamics: Scientific Symposium and Workshop, RARGOM Reports
97-1 (1997).
21. Regional Association for Research on the Gulf of Maine, Gulf of Maine
Circulation Modeling: Workshop Proceedings, RARGOM Reports 94-1 (1994).
22. Regional Association for Research on the Gulf of Maine, Proceedings of the Gulf
of Maine Ecosystem Dynamics: Scientific Symposium and Workshop, RARGOM Reports
97-1 (1997).
23. Regional Association for Research on the Gulf of Maine, The Health of the Gulf
of Maine Ecosystem: Cumulative Impacts of Multiple Stressors: Workshop Report,
RARGOM Report 96-1 (1996).
24. See ECOHAB – Gulf of Maine, http://www.whoi.edu/ecohab/ (last visited June
10, 2010).
25. Id.
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HABs prompt shellfish harvesting shutdowns and can severely impact
local economies. For a dozen years, researchers have shared information
and arranged cooperative scientific activities to examine the drivers and
impacts of HABs in the region by way of the Gulf of Maine ECOHAB
effort.26
A turn of the millennia effort designed to increase the understanding
of the various components of the Gulf of Maine ecosystem can be seen in
the form of the Gulf of Maine Census of Marine Life.27 It is one of seven
regional programs coordinated under the macro-level enterprise Census
of Marine Life (CoML).28 As its census appellations suggest, the
primary focus of the research at the macro and regional levels is to
construct population and resource inventories of marine life and
conditions. The basic premise being that any and all monitoring of
marine systems will result in characterizations and status reports that
would be of little use without baseline or relational understandings of the
regions being examined. The Gulf of Maine Census of Marine life, like
the CoML effort generally, is designed to produce, “enough knowledge
to enable ecosystem-based management in a large marine environment.
The program will advance knowledge of both biodiversity and ecological
processes over a range of habitats and food-chain levels, from plankton
to whales.” 29
While not all of the above-related cross-boundary efforts can
mandate ecosystem management, they all offer methods and approaches
to facilitate transboundary stewardship.
V. CONCLUSION
While neither Canada nor the United States seemed interested in
shared management of the Gulf of Maine when they brought their
dispute to the ICJ Chamber, they both understood, at least to some
degree, the ecological underpinnings of the variety of goods and services
that they garnered from the area. And while some may lament that as
late as the 1980s developed states and learned international tribunals
continued to draw incision like boundary lines through natural systems, it
seems as though the basic three factor relational structure linking
26. See id.
27. See Gulf of Maine Area Census of Marine Life, http://www.usm.maine.edu/
gulfofmaine-census/ (last visited June 10, 2010).
28. Census of Marine Life, Gulf of Maine Area Program (GoMA),
http://www.coml.org/projects/gulf-maine-program-goma (last visited June 10, 2010).
29. Id.
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ecology, resource development, and the evolution of law and policy
ultimately responds in an almost organic way. Potentially frustrating
ecosystem–slicing boundaries seem to, over time, produce ecosystemoriented responses that may result in collaborative management by
stakeholders enlightened by the mutual benefits of collaborative research
and management.
This assessment is merely a first glimpse into ecosystemic regime
building in the Gulf of Maine region. It raises many more questions than
it addresses. Indeed many of the collaborative efforts referred to above,
while possibly serving as foundations for legal regime development, do
not amount to legal principle development and institution building as
those regime-oriented terms are commonly employed. This presentation
is but a start. Future legal research is contemplated that will examine if
and where cross-border efforts more appropriately characterized as legal
regime building exist in response to ecosystem characteristics.

